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Abstract
Contemporary epistemologists of education have raised concerns about the distorting effects of 
some of the processes and structures of contemporary academia on the epistemic practice and 
character of academic researchers. Such concerns have been articulated using the concept of 
epistemic corruption. In this article, we lend credibility to these theoretically motivated concerns 
using the example of the research impact agenda during the period 2012–2014. Interview data 
from UK and Australian academics confirm that the impact agenda system, at its inception, 
facilitated the development and exercise of epistemic vices. As well as vindicating theoretically 
motivated claims about epistemic corruption, inclusion of empirical methods and material can 
help us put the concept to work in ongoing critical scrutiny of evolving forms of the research 
impact agenda.
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Introduction
About a decade ago, the mere mention of the word ‘impact’ in many academic circles 
caused colleagues to react with words of protest, sceptical glares, raised eyebrows, open 
scorn or bemused resignation – and sometimes, all of these at once. Even if most aca-
demics, then as now, would in fact accept the idea that academic research should hope to 
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influence the world for the better (Chubb and Reed, 2017; Trowler, 2001), impact was 
regularly resisted as an academic mandate indicative of a structural move towards a more 
marketised higher education system (Holmwood, 2014; Watermeyer, 2016). A common 
reason for hesitation and resistance was a sense that the obligation to have such influence 
– or impact – might not be smoothly consistent with academics’ wider roles as teachers, 
researchers and scholars as informed by, for instance, Mertonian norms or their alle-
giance to entrenched Enlightenment ideals (Chubb and Watermeyer, 2017; Merton, 
1942). A pursuit of impact, many argued, should not come at the expense of our fidelity 
to other academic values and freedoms (Holmwood, 2014; Ladyman, 2009).
By ‘the impact agenda’, we mean the move to attempt to bureaucratically assess the 
social, cultural and economic impact of research. When the impact criterion was first 
introduced into the research funding process in the United Kingdom and when concur-
rent developments began in Australia, this move was met with significant criticism from 
the field of higher education studies and from the academic community more broadly. 
Early critics in both contexts were quick to offer both principled and practical worries 
about the potentially deleterious effects of institutionalised mechanisms of impact-track-
ing or the ways that the impact agenda may jeopardise academic authenticity with respect 
to gaming, autonomy and identity (Battaly, 2017; Chubb, 2017; Battaly, 2013; Henkel, 
2000; Martin, 2011; Smith et al., 2020; Watermeyer, 2016). We grant that more recent 
work notes some positive effects (Weinstein et al., 2021) and that there have been con-
certed efforts in the policy sphere to shake up the research system, like the government 
consultations on the efficacy of research evaluation in the Nurse (2015) and the Stern 
(2016) reviews of research.
Still, the impact agenda remains as fraught now as it was at its inception following the 
Warry Report (2006). Then, as now, mandating an impact agenda was seen to represent 
the very thing that universities might militate against – where knowledge becomes com-
modity and academic freedoms are eroded (Collini, 2012; Docherty, 2011; Tight, 1985). 
In fact, at this point, we maintain that impact is now more than a mere agenda: it is an 
implemented global policy, with the United Kingdom and Australia at the ‘vanguard’ of 
these developments (Upton et al., 2014). Since evolving forms of impact are here to stay, 
at least into the immediate future, we suggest that we should think carefully about the 
many worries raised by critics, particularly in those earlier days since few studies have 
considered their empirical accuracy. This includes our main preoccupation: that the 
impact agenda is often operationalised in ways that are epistemically corrupting. Before 
we explain the reasons behind this concern, laying out some of the history and rationale 
behind the impact agenda will be useful.
The emergence of an impact agenda in higher education
As outlined, the UK dual support funding system of research includes a need to articu-
late, demonstrate and perform both ex post and ex ante impact as a formal part of the 
‘academic contract’ (Watermeyer, 2014: 359). The United Kingdom’s quality-related 
research (QR) funding allocation system and the Research Excellence Framework 
(REF) officially define impact as ‘an effect on, change or benefit to the economy, soci-
ety, culture, public policy or services, health, the environment or quality of life, beyond 
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academia’ (Research England, 2020: 1). In 2009, there was the formalised introduction 
of ‘Pathways to Impact’ in Research Council bids (UKRI, 2019). The latter mechanism 
was recently abandoned by UKRI in an attempt to better ‘embed’ impact implicitly in 
overall research funding applications, rather than in a specially dedicated section. Under 
this new arrangement, impact is expected to be implicitly addressed throughout any 
research proposal, portending that it is here to stay in UK HE (EPSRC, 2020).
A key theme of the continued focus on impact is a shift to ‘competitive accountability’ 
(Smith et al., 2020; Watermeyer, 2019). Researchers are increasingly required to pro-
mote and (to some extent) ‘market’ or ‘sell’ the value of their endeavour to non-academic 
groups, with the aim being to assure them of the worth of continuing investment in the 
academic sector. All this is consistent with the shift to an increasingly market-orientated 
audit culture in UK Higher Education (Chubb and Watermeyer, 2017; Shore and Wright, 
2003). Such tendencies, as described, easily spread to other national contexts: the United 
Kingdom and Australia, for instance, were engaged in policy borrowing concerning 
research impact from the start, with a focus on impact statements in funding applications 
(through the Australian Research Council) in the early days and trials in impact assess-
ment (e.g. the Excellence in Innovation Assessment trial, 2012) and more recently the 
Excellent in Research Australia assessment. For these reasons, focusing on the British 
and Australian contexts is useful for comparison and discussion (see also Chubb and 
Reed, 2018: 299, Figure 1).
Shifting ground: The evolution of an agenda
The evolution of the impact agenda is shaped by all sorts of complex and contingent 
historical, political, cultural, ideological and institutional events and developments. Not 
all of these are necessarily problematic and we think it is important for critics not to 
reject out of hand the general principle that academic work ought to positively impact 
on wider, non-academic audiences. Nor should critics ignore or dismiss the positive 
attributes of this agenda, like those involving tangible social improvements and promo-
tion of academic engagement tied into rejuvenated notions of public epistemic respon-
sibilities (Chubb and Reed, 2017; Hill, 2016; Oancea, 2019). At its best, we believe that 
research produced in higher education institutions from across disciplines can, and 
often does, serve to enrich our common culture, bolster civic agency and improve the 
quality of democratic discussions. As a result, we propose that criticisms of the impact 
agenda must be respectful of its theoretical promise, but cognisant of the risks involved 
in its practical implementations. We, critics, should also consider how the impact agenda 
is related to other themes that are familiar in wider critical discourses about the current 
state of higher education – its ‘culture of speed’, for instance, or the creeping erosion of 
scholarly integrity in an arena of marketised competition (see, inter alia, Berg and 
Seeber, 2016; Chubb and Watermeyer, 2017; Olssen and Peters, 2005; Rhoads and 
Torres, 2006). All these things are related, but they should not be haphazardly conflated 
with one another, even if some of them – like the ‘culture of speed’ – have also been 
accused of being epistemically corrupting in the same sense at work in this article 
(Kidd, in press).
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Concerns about the impact agenda
It would take a very long article to survey all the different concerns and criticisms 
directed at the impact agenda and doctoral work and larger scale studies have begun to 
do so (Chubb, 2017; Cohen, 2021; Grant et al., 2010). We focus on a striking and under-
explored criticism, one that shows itself in the commonly employed language of corrup-
tion: not in the sense of selling degrees or taking money from Big Tobacco, but in the 
sense of legally sanctioned pressures eroding or damaging the character or integrity of 
academics and, sometimes, of the academic enterprise itself.1 A critical rhetoric of cor-
ruption is common in educational discourses and keys into a sense that much that is 
going wrong in academia causes damage to the character or integrity of academics and 
students. Collini warns that the philistinism of economically focused academic cultures 
risks the ‘corruption’ of scholars’ venerable role as ‘custodians’ of a ‘complex intellec-
tual inheritance’ (Collini, 2012: 199). At the same time, Martha Nussbaum warns that 
pedagogical emphasis on rote learning and memorisation drives out the cultivation of 
humanistic capacities, like empathy and an expansive sensibility, which, if left unchecked, 
will ‘corrupt the mission of humanistic scholarship’ (Nussbaum, 2010: 130). For Michael 
Sandel, a relentless culture of assessment defined in terms of performative goals tends to 
‘erode, or crowd out, or corrupt’ the ‘love of reading’, learning and education for its own 
sake (Sandel, 2012: 61). In these cases, being corrupted is a matter of damage done to the 
motivations, dispositions or character of academics and their students.
A language of corruption is interesting and consistently connected by those employ-
ing it to issues of personal moral and intellectual character. A common complaint is that 
gradual subjection to the pressures of marketisation, philistinism and other social and 
institutional factors damages or in severe cases destroys personal-level excellences – vir-
tues, autonomy, integrity. This extends to the impact agenda too. Collini, for one, criti-
cises it on the grounds that it erodes academic autonomy: the ability of academics to 
wisely and judiciously select projects of relevance and worth. If, as he warns, ‘politicians 
have lost the confidence to tell the electorate that universities best perform their distinc-
tive and peculiar role when granted the intellectual autonomy to decide what areas of 
research will be most fruitful’, then academics get stripped of their capacity to exercise 
those virtues, like discernment and judiciousness, integral to autonomy (Collini, 2011, 
para 3). An impact mandate will, therefore, start to interfere with our capacity to fully 
cultivate and properly exercise virtues that are, in Alasdair MacIntyre’s sense, ‘internal’ 
to our practice as academics.
For Collini, the impact agenda is symptomatic of wider corrupting forces denigrating 
the ‘Haldane Principle’ (Haldane, 1918), a well-established principle in science that aca-
demics must retain ultimate authority in matters of decision-making with regard to which 
bodies of knowledge are worth furthering through research and scholarship. As a basic 
framework and ethos of academic autonomy, it is invoked in arguments against the 
impact agenda and as a part of appeals for a broader and more adequate understanding of 
the value of universities. For our purposes, we also want to emphasise that the Haldane 
Principle, when honoured, creates institutional conditions receptive to the exercise of a 
variety of virtues, like conscientiousness and judiciousness. If an academic system does 
not encourage or facilitate the exercise of such virtues, it is understandable why critics 
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naturally reach for a vocabulary of corruption – for one cannot easily cultivate and dis-
play the personal qualities that are really integral to proper performance of the activities 
integral to academic enquiry. This is the point articulated 50 years ago by Michael 
Oakeshott in his famous lecture on ‘The Frustration of Education’, where he remarked 
that to corrupt something is to treat it in ways that tend to deprive it of its character, of its 
essential, defining, positive features – which, in the case of an individual person, like an 
academic, are their virtues, understood in the Aristotelian sense of ‘excellences of char-
acter’ (Oakeshott, 1971: 57).
We think that the concept of corruption points to an important style of criticism of the 
impact agenda that is implicit in critical discussions, even if rarely explicitly articulated. 
We do not think that one needs to be a virtue theorist to worry about corruption of this 
sort: everyone engaged in academic work recognises that it could be done in better or 
worse ways and that one main determining factor will be the personal qualities of those 
academics who are doing it. A careful and diligent scholar or scientist is better than one 
who is lazy and sloppy, even if possession of those virtues does not, by itself, guarantee 
them success in their endeavours (Baehr, 2011: 1). Intellectual character changes over 
time, though, being shaped by all sorts of factors, including the various pressures, incen-
tives and temptations built into one’s social and professional environment. It is at this 
point that the concept of corruption becomes salient.
We take the term epistemic corruption from recent work by Ian James Kidd, who 
uses it to describe a form of damage done to people’s epistemic character by their sub-
jection to conditions or processes that erode epistemic virtues such as curiosity and 
thoughtfulness and facilitate the epistemic vices like dogmatism or closedmindedness 
(Kidd, 2015; Kidd, 2019, 2020).2 A main claim of his work is that many features of 
modern higher educational systems tend to be epistemically corrupting in the sense that 
they are prone to damage the epistemic characters of academics and students, a strategy 
of criticism developed by other contemporary philosophers of education (Battaly, 2013; 
Forstenzer, 2018).3
We are sympathetic to this style of critical discourse about higher education and want 
to develop it further by applying it to the impact agenda. However, to do so, we must 
amend Kidd’s theoretically motivated account by adding empirical details that serve to 
test its latent empirical claims. In what follows, we offer a retrospective case study 
involving the impact agenda in its relatively recent incarnation in the United Kingdom 
and Australia. We use historical empirical data in the form of interview data from aca-
demics in those countries describing their experiences of the effects that the impact 
agenda has on their academic practice (Chubb, 2017; Chubb and Watermeyer, 2017). By 
doing so, we can test claims about the epistemically corrupting tendencies of the impact 
agenda and gain a richer understanding of the relevant mechanisms of corruption.
Qualitative methods
Interviews were 30–60 minutes long and the participants were sourced via the research 
offices at two research intensive institutions. Participants were contacted via email and 
invited to participate in a study concerning the challenges of the impact agenda in the 
United Kingdom and Australia and were specifically asked about perceptions on its 
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relationship with freedom, value and epistemic responsibility. Participants comprised 
mid-senior career academics with experience in grant writing, from across the range of 
disciplines broadly representative of the arts and humanities, social sciences, physical 
science, maths and engineering and the life and earth sciences. Participants were given 
the opportunity to decline the invitation, provided an information sheet about the study 
and an informed consent sheet. Almost all potential participants contacted could take 
part and those who did not cited time as the main barrier for participation. Interview 
transcripts were analysed using discourse analysis, inductively coded at keywords related 
to the prominent vices/virtues referenced in the data. Informed consent forms were 
signed by participants, which promised anonymity and confidentiality of the data pro-
vided. This article, through the lens of this empirical data, clustered vices by approaching 
the data inductively and recognising and forming patterns through an inductive analysis. 
This was cross-checked and discussed across the research team, who kept a reflexive 
account of how these were formed. The data included in this article will be identified by 
the discipline and the national context in brackets, from the study by Chubb (2017).
By using these data and the concept of epistemic corruption, we offer an analysis of the 
effects of the impact agenda on the epistemic conduct and character of academics that is 
both conceptually sophisticated and empirically informed. Our claim is that the evolving 
forms taken by the impact agenda have created at least three core structural conditions that 
facilitate the development and exercise of two specific clusters of epistemic vices. A main 
value of the interview data is that they reveal the awareness of interviewees of what we 
are calling epistemically corrupting structures and their complex responses to them.
Limitations of the research
We draw our findings from a sample of 50 academics from the United Kingdom and 
Australia (2012–2014). These data represent the common attitudes and feelings of aca-
demics working in higher education at the time of the emergence of the impact agenda in 
both settings. In the case of Australia, talk of an impact agenda was especially naissant–
as such talk of impact was similar to talking about something in the abstract, despite its 
appearance in some funding calls. The ‘newness’ of impact, at that time, could be seen to 
be reflected in some of the strong and emotional responses found in the data. We suggest 
that though these data are historical–despite developments and changes in and to the 
impact agenda–they form a rich and authentic baseline from which to explore experi-
ences of and responses to epistemic corruption. Some of these experiences will evolve in 
line with new iterations of the impact agenda, though previous experiences will set up 
expectations that shape future ones. The content of some of the responses may be spe-
cific to particular iterations too, although the range of general kinds of responses is likely 
to be fairly stable.
Epistemic vice and corruption
Contemporary educational theory and practice is seeing renewed interest in the venera-
ble idea that cultivation of moral and intellectual character by educating for the virtues 
ought to be the primary aim of education.4 Such interest encompasses many different 
154 Theory and Research in Education 19(2)
groups of virtues, comes from many quarters, from policy-experts and education 
researchers to theorists of education. It has also elicited different sorts of responses, rang-
ing from warm welcomes to staunch criticism – a situation complicated by long-standing 
debates internal to philosophical virtue theory. An unfortunate feature of these debates, 
however, is a failure to attend carefully to the possibility that educational experiences 
and systems can promote vices as well as virtues (Battaly, 2013; Cooper, 2008; Forstenzer, 
2018). Whether or not one thinks that education should promote a certain set of virtues, 
one can still worry about it feeding an array of vices, including epistemic vices like arro-
gance, closed-mindedness, dogmatism, epistemic inflexibility, un-reflectiveness and 
other objectionable attitudes, character traits and ways of thinking (Cassam, 2019).
Epistemic vices develop under the influence of all sorts of conditions, which will 
include structural features of our social environments, in ways that the concept of epis-
temic corruption aims to capture. For this reason, epistemic corruption should be under-
stood as a dynamic process, unfolding over time as individuals interact with their social 
environments. When analysing epistemic corruption, one should attend to four things 
(Kidd, 2019: §2):
1. The epistemic vice(s);
2. The corruptor (the source or agent of corruptor);
3. The corruptees (the person or thing whose character is being corrupted);
4. The corrupting conditions or processes.
Before we proceed to our case study – which covers (2) to (4) – we need to say more 
about the nature of epistemic vices. Following Heather Battaly (2014), we conceive of 
epistemic vices as traits of epistemic character that make us bad thinkers. Vices can do 
this in one or both of two ways. Effects-vices are traits that tend to cause a preponderance 
of bad epistemic effects: inattentiveness, for instance, means one will systematically fail 
to detect epistemically relevant features or a situation, in ways that impair one’s ability 
to acquire knowledge and understanding. Motives-vices are traits that are vicious because 
they express or manifest bad epistemic motives or values, such as an indifference to 
truth, or a desire to interfere with the epistemic agency of others, a sort of epistemic 
malevolence (Baehr, 2011; Cassam, 2019).
Since epistemic vices are integral to appraisals and performance of epistemic agency, 
an important part of vice epistemology involved attending to issues of aetiology and 
responsibility – that is, to issues of the origins or sources of people’s epistemically 
vicious characters and the extent, if any, to which we can hold them responsible and 
blameworthy. The typical automatic movement from attribution of vices to accusation 
and blame is unwise, since the aetiology of epistemic vice is often psychologically and 
sociologically complex. Compare two dogmatic people: the first grows up with dogmati-
cally aggressive peers in a deeply repressive society of underfunded schools, a culture of 
sneering at science and learning and a monopolistic media environment; the second 
grows up with open-minded peers, good teachers and a pluralistic social environment 
with a genuinely free press, rich sources of information and a culture of public debate. 
All things being equal, intuitively, we would consider the former person not to be respon-
sible for either becoming or remaining dogmatic, given the conditions of their epistemic 
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socialisation, whereas the second person, afforded every opportunity to become open-
minded and critically lucid, would be considered to be much more responsible for their 
dogmatism (Battaly, 2016b; Kidd, 2016). When analysing agential epistemic vices, a 
wiser strategy involves exploring the aetiology of their epistemic character, attending to 
the array of conditions, interactions and structures, which can feed or starve the develop-
ment of virtues and vices. When epistemic vices are the products of our sustained subjec-
tion to epistemically corrupting systems, then we can attribute vices without necessarily 
wanting to also add blame into the mix (Battaly, 2019).
We can now say that epistemic corruption occurs when one or more epistemic vices 
are acquired, intensified or entrenched as a result of the agent operating within or being 
subjected to environments that facilitate their development and exercise. Individual 
agents have more or less malleable epistemic dispositions – that is, dispositions to assess, 
criticise, evaluate, reflect, theorise and understand in effective ways. The dispositions 
can become stronger and more stable, until they acquire the status of virtues or vices, 
depending on whether they are positive or negative. Our epistemic characters may, there-
fore, consist only partly of virtues and vices, construed in the traditional Aristotelian 
sense of fully formed and cross-situationally stable virtues and vices – an empirical claim 
defended by Christian Miller (2017).
Given the plasticity of our epistemic characters, a natural concern of practically 
minded character epistemologists is to find ways of organising our communities and 
environments to try to ensure they are maximally conducive to the cultivation of virtues 
and the nullification of vices. A newly emerging literature has begun to explore the range 
of options from individual practices of epistemic self-reform to more ambitious propos-
als for transformation of the wider social-epistemic environment (Battaly, 2016a; 
Medina, 2012; Wilson and Miller, 2018).
Using the terminology offered by Kidd, we claim that a practice, community or envi-
ronment that is conducive to the cultivation and exercise of virtues is edifying – in the 
sense of building or strengthening a structure (edificio, in Romance languages, means 
‘building’, in its nominal and dynamic senses). A person is edified when their character 
is built up or strengthened through the cultivation of their virtues, the excellences or 
strengths of character. By contrast, an agent becomes corrupted when their character is 
damaged or weakened, hence the sense of vices as ‘defects’. Such corruption might 
involve the acquisition of new vices, never previously a feature of one’s character, or the 
entrenchment or the intensification of one’s vices – perhaps one’s incipient inflexibility 
slowly becomes a relentless dogmatism.
Epistemically corrupting environments are ones whose norms, practices and struc-
tures tend to facilitate the acquisition, entrenchment or exacerbation of epistemic vices 
and failings by agents embedded within them. The crucial diagnostic task, for those with 
ameliorative concerns, is to identify the relevant corrupting conditions in that environ-
ment, so that they can be removed or weakened. Since our epistemic environments are 
hugely diverse in their scale, structure, goals and so on, we cannot provide anything like 
a comprehensive listing of the corrupting conditions. An additional set of complications 
is that (1) there may be generic corrupting conditions that feed a variety of vices as well 
as those specific to certain vices, (2) individual agents differ in their susceptibilities to 
epistemic corruption due to a variety of idiosyncratic and situational factors, (3) 
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conditions can be stronger or weaker and therefore sometimes difficult to detect and (4) 
all but the most highly epistemically corrupting environments also contain at least some 
edifying conditions as well. All of this suggests that we ought to conceive epistemic cor-
ruption as a diachronic and dynamic process, rather than a static inevitability within a 
given environment – a process agents can repond to in all sorts of ways (Monypenny, 
2021; Tessman, 2005).
We suggest, however, that there are certain generally corrupting conditions, ones that 
act such as to facilitate the acquisition, entrenchment or exacerbation of many epistemic 
vices and failings. ‘Facilitate’, as it pertains to epistemic corruption, can mean ‘make 
possible’, ‘enable’, ‘encourage’, ‘legitimate’, ‘reward’ or ‘conceal’, among other things. 
Consider, for instance, these generically corrupting conditions, each of which, in differ-
ent ways, facilitates epistemic viciousness:
•• The absence of systems to monitor and correct for epistemically vicious 
actions and patterns of behaviour: Since an agent can perform vicious acts 
without being considered at that time as having a vice, it is crucial that as 
many of those acts as possible should be reliably detected and effectively 
counteracted. Monitoring and corrective systems can, therefore, act as a guard 
against corruption, such that their absence tends to be a corrupting condition 
(for instance, studies of business institutions show that honesty is encouraged 
by a combination of regular audits and positive peer-established social norms 
(Cardinaels and Jia, 2016).
•• The absence or derogation of exemplars of virtue: Some people are inspirational 
and are practical models for personal epistemic excellence act as a spur to the 
development of virtue in others. Absence of exemplars is corrupting since, with-
out them, the community lacks one of the most effective means for identifying, 
understanding and cultivating virtues. Derogation of exemplars – through acts of 
mockery, sneering, ridicule – corrupts by undermining our ability or willingness 
to recognise exemplars or even to admit their existence. Without them, a drift into 
vice becomes more likely, since the counterbalance of virtuous exemplars is lack-
ing (Croce and Vaccarezza, 2017; Gray and Jordan, 2012).
•• Increasing the exercise costs for virtue: One can corrupt someone by making it 
harder for them to exercise their virtues which, over time, weakens the rootedness 
of virtue in their psychology and contributes to its dishabituation. Being truthful, 
for instance, often incurs real social costs since it can involve embarrassing or 
‘betraying’ people by ‘telling uncomfortable truths’ and reaping the wrath of those 
who consider themselves aggrieved. By reacting negatively to the exercise of the 
virtue of truthfulness, people generate a corrupting environment, since their 
judgements and actions increase the price to be paid for truthfulness – a price not 
all of us can always afford to pay.
•• The rebranding of vices as virtues: Since many agents would be alarmed at the 
idea of their being or becoming vicious, one can circumvent their resistance by 
rebranding their vices as virtues. Once a vice is perceived as a virtue, many 
agents will cease practical measures aimed at its removal or nullification. 
Dogmatism becomes ‘firmness’, arrogance becomes ‘confidence’, rudeness 
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becomes ‘directness’. As a strategy of corruption, rebranding is especially insidi-
ous, because it reinforces our natural desire to ignore or deny our vices.
•• The establishment of conditions that necessitate the exercise of vice: Our vices are 
always expressed in certain forms of moral, social or epistemic practice. Whether 
by accident or design, certain practices can develop such that performing them 
requires one to exercise certain vices. In some circumstances, the preservation of 
an advantageous but unfair system, requires exercising the vice of lying or occlud-
ing the truth from others. Think, for example, of Major League Baseball in the 
1990s and early 2000s, the culture of doping had become so pervasive and the 
popularity of the sport so high as to make speaking out about the widespread use 
of steroids very costly for individual players. Although some did eventually speak 
out – notoriously Canseco (2005, 2008) – most players kept quiet precisely 
because their careers depended on it.
•• The valorisation of vicious conduct and exemplars: Assuming that our concep-
tions of good and bad epistemic character and conduct are informed, to some 
significant degree, by the examples available from within our communities, a per-
son can become corrupted if those held up as exemplars are actually vicious. By 
emulating those people, one becomes vicious and, therefore, corrupted (Zagzebski, 
2017: ch. 2, sects 3–5). Consider situations where those ‘big names’ in one’s 
department or discipline – held up as heroes or as professional models – are 
aggressively adversarial, egoistic and prone to dominative behaviours, like derid-
ing their ‘rivals’ or sneering at ‘lesser’ work (Moulton, 1980; Rooney, 2010). 
Unless their status as admirable exemplars is challenged, they will almost cer-
tainly be emulated and this leads to the corruption of their admirers.
These are just some of the generic processes of corruption, applicable to most if not 
all the vices, using examples from various institutional and professional domains (busi-
ness, philosophy, sport and so on). All of them facilitate the development and exercise of 
vices, although in different ways – the valorisation of exemplars of vice mainly encour-
ages viciousness, for instance, whereas rebranding arguably conceals the presence of 
actual or emerging vices.
With these remarks on epistemic vices and corruption in place, we will now focus on 
the claim that the impact agenda is creating epistemically corrupting conditions in the 
higher education systems of Australia and the United Kingdom. Our claim is that the 
sociological data about the effects of the impact agenda on the conduct and character of 
Australian and British academics clearly indicates that conditions are being created that 
encourage the development of two main sets of epistemic vices, the appetitive and the 
alethic.
Vice-clusters
There are many different epistemic vices, organisable in different ways, and an epistemi-
cally corrupting system can promote some or all of them. Based on the interview data, 
we think it is clear that two main clusters of epistemic vices were most consistently 
reported as being in some way encouraged, promoted or otherwise facilitated by the 
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institutionalised forms of impact agenda in Australia and Britain at that time. A vice-
cluster, here, is a specific set of epistemic vices that share some characteristic in com-
mon, and the theoretical practice of identifying these clusters can be called epistemic 
vice taxonomy (Kidd, 2019: §2B). The vice taxonomies are best conceived as pragmatic 
artefacts that help us think efficiently about such things as patterns in the specific vices 
of the mind within a specific community, rather than as delineations of any objective 
ordering.
The two vice-clusters most commonly reported in the interviews were what we shall 
label ‘appetitive vices’ and ‘alethic vices’. The appetitive vices are those that involve 
excesses or deficiencies of epistemic appetites, that is, our appetites for epistemic goods, 
like beliefs, knowledge and understanding. Incuriosity is a vice marking a deficient epis-
temic appetite, a lack of appropriate appetites for relevant, salient epistemic goods and, 
therefore, a vice and another is epistemic insensibility (Battaly, 2010; Battaly, 2013; 
Bloomfield, 2019). By contrast, the most famous appetitive epistemic virtue is curiosity 
(Watson, 2018). Alethic vices involve failures to respond appropriately to truth such as 
dishonesty and untruthfulness and the alethic virtues include honesty, sincerity and truth-
fulness (Williams, 2002). Expressions of the alethic vices include lying, deceit, dishon-
esty, ‘bending the truth’, failing to properly contextualise claims and what Frankfurt 
(2005) memorably described as ‘bullshitting’.
Our interview data contain many references to these two clusters of epistemic vices, 
alongside a more diffuse set of other failings. In what follows, we focus on alethic vices, 
not least since truth is one of the most fundamental epistemic ideals of modernity and a 
central value of academic enquiry (Williams, 2002: ch.1). Our claim is that the impact 
agenda has established and is currently entrenching norms, structures and cultures that 
are facilitating the acquisition and exercise of alethic vices. The interviewees very help-
fully identified and explained the relevant sorts of corrupting conditions. Specifically, 
the data indicate three main sorts of general structural conditions that facilitate the exer-
cise and development of alethic vices: incentive structures, structural constraints and 
increased exercise costs for virtuous truthfulness.
Corrupting structures
Incentive structures
To start with, the interviewees consistently argued that the impact agenda was creating 
and entrenching incentive structures that encourage the giving of false, inflated or exag-
gerated estimates of the actual or likely impact and benefits of research. By providing 
those sorts of professional incentives, those structures corrupted alethic vices like inac-
curacy, insincerity and hyperbole.
Consider one Australian academic, working in the Arts and Humanities, who describes 
how the impact agenda militates against truthfulness about the methods and outcomes of 
research in two ways:
I think that one would be hard pressed to write a successful grant application that’s fully 
truthful, even if it’s for no other reason than to comment on one’s own research environment, 
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but also when one has to go out of one’s way to make up a story about the kinds of significance 
and social impact that grants have to have. (Arts, Australia; Chubb, 2017).
How do grant application systems militate against properly truthful description of 
one’s research environment? First, when asked privately, many academics willingly 
report the absence from their institutions of vital research resources – from access to 
essential journals to research assistance support to funding for research trips. But truthful 
reporting of the inadequacies of one’s research environment would weaken an applica-
tion, since one is admitting that one would be attempting research under suboptimal 
conditions. Second, statements of the actual or likely impact of research often require 
exaggeration, whether of the scale or significance or certainty of ‘social impact’. If some 
research has a limited scale or modest significance, then it may be regarded as less 
impressive, creating an incentive to inflate. But such inflation is often a failure of truth-
fulness, especially of accuracy and sincerity.
Another way that structures can entrench alethic vices is by introducing incentives for 
academics to consciously succumb to the temptation to strategically abandon the virtue 
of truthfulness for the sake of participation in certain academic structures. Truthfulness 
is, after all, one of the virtues that acts to help us resist the temptations to distort and 
exaggerate our claims, consistent with the virtuous desire for what Williams calls a 
‘sense of reality’ (Williams, 2002: ch. 6). For example, one interviewee states,
The problem is, it’s ex ante! It’s a guess! And people make it up – they make it sound huge! 
(Life and Natural Science, Australia; Chubb, 2017)
Another interviewee, a UK-based researcher in the Physical Sciences and Engineering 
says, ‘there is no possible way they could make [claims about future impact] concrete, 
because there needs to be a lot of additional future research before one can have any 
concrete idea about what the impact will be’ (Physical Science, United Kingdom). When 
making claims about future outcomes, truthfulness would typically require the exercise 
of epistemic virtues like cautiousness, tentativeness and reticence – a cluster of disposi-
tions that can correct for our tendencies to overstatement, exaggeration or pretension to 
a greater degree of confidence than one could epistemically warrant. Truthfulness, in 
these cases, requires that one makes carefully qualified, conditional claims of the sort 
Michel de Montaigne (1991: 1165) praised when stating his preference for words and 
phrases that ‘soften and moderate’ the typical ‘rashness’ of speech – ‘probably’, ‘possi-
bly’, ‘as far as I know’, ‘based on available information’ and so on. The worry is that 
incentive structures are discouraging the giving of cautious, tentative accounts of the 
social impact of research. If so, they corrupt by encouraging the alethic vices.
Structural constraints
The impact agenda will also promote the exercise of vices of truth when it establishes or 
strengthens structural constraints that tend to discourage or prevent giving properly 
truthful descriptions of one’s research practices. The untruthfulness in these cases is self-
directed, insofar as one is being inaccurate, distorting or dishonest about one’s own 
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research practices. A physical scientist, based in the United Kingdom, describes the self-
descriptions of research practices as ‘disingenuous’, in the sense that they involve pro-
viding accounts of those practices that one knows to be inconsistent with the actual 
realities of those practices.
[T]he trouble is, it’s disingenuous. No scientist really begins the true process of scientific 
discovery with the belief it is going to follow this very smooth path to impact, because he or she 
knows full well that just doesn’t occur, and so there’s a real problem with the impact agenda – 
and that it’s not true, it’s wrong, it flies in the face of scientific practice. (Physical Science, 
United Kingdom; Chubb, 2017)
In this case, the interviewee is pointing to the fact that no scientist could genuinely 
endorse the smooth, tidy accounts of the process of scientific research required by the 
impact system – ones that present an untenably neat account of research as a process that 
inevitably delivers guaranteed outcomes. Although an impression of inevitable progres-
sion from research to outputs to impact makes an impact pathway look attractive to 
evaluators, no-one with both an informed understanding of the realities of scientific prac-
tice – in the laboratory, at the workbench or in the field – and a commitment to truthful-
ness would endorse it. Giving distorted accounts of the process of scientific research is 
an old problem, which predates the impact agenda.5 An interviewee notes: ‘[Y]ou can’t 
get a proposal through if it tells untruths, [viz.] scientific fallacies, but you can get a pro-
posal through if it tells impact fallacies’ (United Kingdom, Physical Science). Moreover, 
an Australian social sciences researcher offers an amusing example of the ways in which 
the format of funding and impact documentation can require untruthfulness to the point 
of absurdity:
[A]ctually it literally said ‘write down what you’re going to discover’. Well, if I can write down 
what I’m going to discover, I’ve discovered it. It was a dumb question, but it was put in there 
by someone who doesn’t know what research is. I don’t know what you’re supposed to say – 
something like, ‘I’m Columbus, I’m going to discover the West Indies. (Social Science, 
Australia; Chubb, 2017)
Two salient points are worth noting here, the first is that the research document in 
question was either seen to be written by someone with no informed understanding of the 
realities of research practice or written by someone willing to tolerate the giving of false 
information with regard to the ultimate object of any one research project. Either way, 
the document is seen to invite at best a false account of scientific research and at worst 
outright exaggeration for the sake of gamesmanship.
Increased exercise costs
An epistemically corrupting system both promotes the development and exercise of vari-
ous epistemic vices and makes it more difficult for people to cultivate and exercise the 
epistemic virtues. One way to make virtues more difficult is to increase their exercise 
costs. Exercising truthfulness, for instance, can be made harder by removing or weaken-
ing social norms of truthfulness or by introducing formal and informal penalties or 
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punishments for those who are truthful, or by changing incentive structures in ways that 
militate against acts of truthfulness. The interview data indicate that these sorts of anti-
truthfulness conditions are part of the institutionalisation of the impact agenda:
If you can find me a single academic who hasn’t had to bullshit or bluff or lie or embellish in 
order to get grants, then I will find you an academic who’s in trouble with his HoD (Head of 
Department). If you don’t play the game, you won’t do well by your university. So, anyone 
that’s so ethical that they won’t bend the rules in order to play the game is going to be in trouble, 
which is deplorable. (Arts and Humanities, Australia; Chubb, 2017)
This academic testifies to their experience of social and professional pressures that 
make it more difficult to exercise truthfulness – the disapproval of their Head of 
Department, potential threats to promotion prospects, removal of the goodwill of their 
superiors and so on. Another interviewee reports similar pressures, this time concerning 
inducements to disguise the true nature of one’s work to make it fit into the impact agenda:
When somebody says, ‘I want to do this’, the kind of advice that they have to seek is how to 
disguise their actual agenda in order to create the agenda set up by funding agencies. (Arts and 
Humanities, Australia; Chubb, 2017)
A certain degree of pragmatism about the presentation of projects is not, in itself, a 
failure of truthfulness. But this is something different, since it involves disguising in 
substantial ways the essential character of one’s research projects and also feigning cer-
tain motivations. The inducements to be untruthful about the quality of one’s institutional 
environment also recurs, this time in the context of structural pressures to secure grant 
income:
[Y]ou’re also asked to describe the research environment at your own institution. Now, nobody 
is going to draw attention to the fact, to things that they don’t like about the research environment 
at their own institution, so you’re made to lie in these kinds of ways. (Arts and Humanities, 
Australia; Chubb, 2017)
We have considered just three structural conditions that, according to the interview-
ees, are experienced as epistemically corrupting. The institutional enactments of the 
impact agenda at that time in those countries were creating structures and constraints that 
militate against the exercise of alethic virtues, like truthfulness and, in turn, encouraged 
and rewarded the exercise of alethic vices, like dishonesty and disingenuousness. The 
identification of specific structural corruptors advances our understanding of the social 
mechanisms of epistemic corruption in a way that empirically confirms Kidd’s initial 
analysis. Moreover, we can gain other things from the interview data – for instance, the 
different ways that those who are alert to those corrupting influences can try to resist 
them, whether through attempting to reform the structures or by developing coping 
responses at the personal level. Those would all be useful directions for future research 
on the impact agenda in higher education, which we think is very much needed, since 
further research might show that there are differences across national context, career 
stage and, of course, discipline. Furthermore, there have been recent developments in the 
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implementation of the impact agenda in the United Kingdom and Australia and these 
may well have led to subtle changes in and a sense of accommodation to an agenda now 
very much into its teenage years as opposed to its fragile infancy (which is the period 
covered by empirical evidence in this article). Ultimately, we hope that this article shows 
there can be very useful roles for empirically informed virtue and vice talk in education 
and especially for the concept of epistemic corruption in critical educational discourses. 
After all, the main practical motivation for ‘the project of vice reduction’ is that, as recent 
experiences have intimated, a world of widespread epistemically vicious conduct is ‘too 
ghastly to contemplate’ (Cassam, 2019: 186, 187).
Impact without corruption?
The data suggest that many academics experienced the earlier incarnations of the impact 
agenda as epistemically corrupting, at least for vices in the alethic and appetitive clusters. 
It is clear that some of the corrupting conditions are still in place, but also likely that oth-
ers have been removed or weakened and that other new ones may have emerged – for 
instance, game-playing and competition (Weinstein et al., 2021). If so, then analyses of 
epistemic corruption must be active and continuous, not conducted periodically or ex 
post facto. Some kinds of corrupting conditions can be anticipated in advance, even if 
others only show themselves once they are in place.
As with many institutional phenomena, what is really needed is constant scrutiny and 
careful vigilance, but not just to try to minimise the range of corrupting features built into 
our academic cultures. Some deeper issues are at stake. If knowledge production is really 
to have a practical benefit to wider society, then we must think seriously about the 
responsibility that the academic community has to wider social and political culture. We 
already know that there are complicated moral and political issues about the ways we 
aim to impact society, not to mention genuine uncertainties about the sorts of impact 
academic research can have over long periods of time. Many academic developments 
take a great deal of time to come to fruition and there is no intrinsic connection between 
research that aims to be of immediate use to practical features of human life and the 
depth of influence any one body of research has actually ended up having on our com-
munal lives. ‘Blue skies research’ often yields goods that lead to profound structural 
changes across many spheres of human activity. But this will be jeopardised by epistemi-
cally corrupting systems.
We can also be concerned about epistemic corruption within academia in the context 
of even larger issues. The challenge of envisioning an impact agenda that is less prone 
to the kind of corrupting tendencies we have described is more than a mere policy 
design problem. It invites fundamental questions about, inter alia, the nature of knowl-
edge, the status of truth as an ideal, our confidence in the reliability of the accountability 
mechanisms essential to academic systems and the moral commitments of academics 
and higher education institutions. It will never be enough to celebrate the pursuit of 
truth as an ideal unless we also populate our communities with inquirers who are truth-
seekers –that is, with people who are disposed to care about and work hard to acquire 
rich epistemic goods. To do that, we need to ask big questions about how to arrange 
academic, social and political communities to promote the virtues of truth-telling and 
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truth-seeking and all the other epistemic virtues. And we must also think in similarly 
energetic ways about those epistemic vices whose baleful effects on life are documented 
by contemporary vice epistemologists (Kidd et al., 2020).
Concluding thoughts and further research
To thoroughly investigate the effects of epistemic corruption, we must deal with practi-
cal, empirical and theoretical concerns. This requires academia to forego antiquated 
dichotomies between purely intellectual and narrowly practical work and an unhelpful 
contrast between philosophical and empirical considerations. Impact has implications 
that cut across each of these domains and so must be dealt with in an accordingly broad-
minded way. We propose to take seriously concerns about the epistemically corrupting 
potential of impact and maintain that it should be a central part of further research. 
Indeed, the application of epistemic corruption as a framework on existing datasets, 
which shed light on later iterations of the impact agenda might be a useful starting point. 
If changing forms of the research impact agenda retain their epistemically corrupting 
tendencies, then there are downstream implications for the place of academic knowledge 
as it relates to democratic deliberation, civic and social life and human inquiry. If Ralph 
Waldo Emerson is right that ‘character is higher than intellect’, then corrupting systems 
that lead to spoilage of epistemic character entails wastage of our communal collective 
intellectual resources. Further policies designed to address the impact agenda ought to 
consider to what extent they are epistemically corrupting. To do this, we suggest that a 
multi-disciplinary conversation involving voices from across different communities and 
disciplines combining theory with empirics is a promising way forward.
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Notes
1. However, the 2019 US admissions scandal (Jaschik, 2019) and the growing influence of Koch 
money on US campuses (Shulman, 2015) strongly suggest that this dimension of straightfor-
ward academic corruption is indeed worthy of serious attention.
2. This notion of corruption echoes the processive conception of corruption to be found among 
the ancient Greeks – pthora for Plato and parekbaseis for Aristotle denote the degeneration or 
perversion of a political system (Mulgan, 2012: 29).
3. On epistemic virtues and vices, see the studies by Baehr (2011) and Kidd et al. (2020).
4. As evidenced perhaps most obviously by the British Department for Education’s (2019) pub-
lication of a ‘Character Education Framework Guidance’.
5. It goes back at least to the chemist Peter Medawar’s (1963) famous article, ‘Is the Scientific 
Paper a Fraud?’, which criticised the ways that scientific journal articles presented ‘sanitised’ 
versions of scientific methods that tidied away all the messiness of actual practice.
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